The 2018 election in Mexico was an unequivocal victory for Morena and AMLO (Lopez Obrador), its leader. AMLO captured 53% of the vote in what was previously a fairly evenly split electorate (if you look at 2000, 2006 and 2012). This time the PAN got 22% of the vote and the PRI just 16%. But their losses and Morena's gains did not end there. AMLO's coalition also won a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, controlling 300 out of 500 seats and a majority in the Senate too. Morena also won 4 of the 9 governorships plus Mexico City and won control of 19 of 24 (of 32 states on the ballot) state legislatures. All of this ftom a party that was founded in 2014 after AMLO split from the PRD, the previous party of the left, whose remnants shifted to the center and now are on the verge of political extinction.
What does all this mean? Actually, it is hard to say. The AMLO of 2006 wanted to reverse the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and many alarmed neoliberal commentators fear that AMLO will do just this.
But the AMLO of today sings a different tune. He is focused on eliminating corruption within the Mexican state, which has been entrenched by the decades of PRI rule that we have read about and which you discussed in the first writing assignment. AMLO wants to leave neoliberalism alone. He does not want to end NAFTA. He does not want to raise taxes on the rich, even though Mexico is dead last in the OECD (the Organization of Economic Development and Cooperation - these are the developed countries of which Mexico is a low ranking member) in tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. AMLO wanted to ease his way into the presidency and avoid provoking a massive capital flight. One business owner warned his workers to watch their spending, because they might not have incomes after an AMLO victory, which would cause an immediate economic collapse in Mexico. AMLO struggled to counteract these types of fears and evidence suggests that he was successful. After all, he won with no economic chaos or collapse.
All of this is well and good but there are certain underlying problems that AMLO cannot avoid. Mexico still has a very high rate of poverty, 52%. What this figure reflects is the way that working people have been pushed out of their previous livelihoods through the advent of neoliberalism which caters to the interests of transnational economic actors - corporations, investors, hedge funds, and banks. Mexico has a huge informal sector. And, of course, even people who work in the formal sector face the constraints of economic competition. The onus is always on the poor and near poor to become more competitive. But many become alienated and turn toward the criminal economy because neoliberal Mexico does not offer them decent life chances. Previous Mexican governments have been in cahoots with the drug cartels but they have also arrested their leaders and extradited some to the US. But criminal organizations are fracturing, diversifying and becoming more and more violent. The cycle of poverty and violence has not been broken; to the contrary, it has grown stronger as Mexico has experienced its highest murder rate in the last 20 years.
So what does the future look like? AMLO has come out with a couple of initiatives that have the support of the business class, such as spending more on education and anti-poverty measures. The business elites are not running for the hills. The peso is not experiencing a devaluation. For now there is relative stability. But NAFTA is hanging on a thread because of Trump's protectionism. The question that I wonder about is whether it is possible to shift the trajectory of neoliberalism in a more progressive direction under AMLO. There might be some basis for this in Mexico's past. Recall that Lazzaro Cardenas was able overcome the conservative influence of his predecessor and behind the scenes political boss Plutarco Calles by mobilizing the support of workers and peasants. This is what AMLO has been able to do so far with the 2018 elections. For him, popular support has been translated into political power.
It is possible, of course, that Morena could congeal into another corrupt political party. There are at least four reasons to hope that this does not occur. First, Mexico's legislators now can run for re-election so they do not have to prove themselves to the party elite, but to the people. Second, Morena's victories at level of the state legislatures are going to disrupt a lot of regional political fiefdoms that have emerged over the course of PRI era. This means that anti-poverty policy might be more readily shaped by a discourse of rights of the poor rather than the extent to which the poor are able to prostrate themselves as clients of the political elite, which was central of the politics of PRI hegemony. Third, AMLO might assert his independence from the US's disastrous drug prohibition policies, which have had the counter-productive effect of helping to entrench drug cartels. This is simply the pattern of the war on drugs since Nixon started in the 1970s. One hopeful gesture from AMLO is his intent to legalize recreational marijuana in Mexico. Fourth, there are a lot more women in Mexican politics. This is because parties are now required to nominate 50% of women for the seats that they are vying for. Half of Morena's new Senate majority is female. Women are not above political corruption but on the whole, they are more concerned about women's experiences and issues and this augurs for a more concentrated attack on poverty.
So, to conclude, political change has come to Mexico. And there are reasons to be hopeful about it.
Comments
Post a Comment