Mexican Militarization

 While Mexico is failing to come to terms with water shortages, the country is also becoming increasingly militarized.  The government of AMLO has done an about face by first of all establishing the national guard that would be subject to civil authority and then by transferring authority of the National Guard to the Secretary of Defense - or Sedena - so that the guard is now under military command.  AMLO says that he does not need the authority of the Mexican Congress to do this and can transfer control by means of a presidential order, but he would like this arrangement to be constitutionalized so that it could not be reversed by whoever his successor might be.  

The key security rationale is the corruption of civilian bureaucracies, which was the story, supposedly, with the disbandment of the federal police with the establishment of the National Guard and the dissolution of previous federal police forces in the wake of corruption scandals - the most notable being the arrest of Jesus Guttierez Rebollo for his aid to Juarez Cartel and drug trafficker Amado Carrillo Fuentes. Gutierrez made several show attempts to capture Carillo - while also tipping him off about government moves - in an effort, before his arrest, to convince the U.S. of Mexico’s war on drugs bonafides so that the U.S. would certify that Mexico was assisting in this conflict and therefore eligible for U.S. foreign aid. This is ancient history - 1997.  Of more recent vintage is the arrest of Salvador Cinefuegos by U.S. authorities in 2019, followed by the DOJ dropping charges and returning Cienfuegos to Mexico, where the Mexican government also declined to charge him. So the idea that the Mexican military is immune to corruption does not stand up to scrutiny.  

AMLO’s move might be seen in relationship to the calls from the Catholic Church to revise his so far failed security strategy, “abrazos no balos”.  It is hard to fathom what his security strategy actually is, though. Several observations can be made, however.  The military has taken over a range of additional functions - overseeing the construction of the Mayan Tren and overseeing customs administration. Here, in fact, is an overview of governmental functions taken over by the military during AMLO’s sexenio: 

In conjunction with this, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has begun to operate through Mexico’s border enforcement in order to intercept travelers to Mexico whom they suspect might attempt to enter the United States in an unauthorized fashion.  This is preemptive defense against would be undocumented migratns.  More generally, AMLO’s government, under threat of trade sanctions from the United States, reassigned a large portion of the National Guard to interdicting Central American migrants moving through Mexico to the U.S.-Mexico border.  The National Guard has been converted into an extension of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

The Human Rights Organization Centro Pro Augustin published a major report on the National Guard in 2021, some of which is summarized in this article from Proceso.  The report notes that there are very weak external controls over the Nation Guard from the FGN (Fiscalia General de la Nacion) and the Mexican Senate.  Internally, the principal agency of control accountability is la Unidad de Asuntos Internos, whose leader is named by the President and whose current occupant (as of July 2021) is David Enrique Velarde Siguenza, a military officer with a checkered past:  Siguenza was part of the military judicial police, working under the military attorney general.  Proceso notes that  

…durante su paso por la PJM estuvo involucrado con su personal en actos de tortura contra miembros del Ejército con el propósito de vincular al general Ricardo Martínez Perea con el Cartel del Golfo en Tamaulipas. Igualmente, este semanario consignó los señalamientos que la CNDH hizo contra el general.

In other words, the Siguenza was part of the nexus that linked military elites to organized crime groups, which, suggests Proceso, is history repeating itself. 

El nombre de Velarde Sigüenza también salió a relucir por hechos similares ocurridos durante el gobierno de Calderón: toleró la tortura de soldados para encauzar a oficiales de alto rango por delincuencia organizada, robo y desaparición forzada. En tanto que en 2015, como responsable del Octavo Regimiento Mecanizado, estuvo a cargo de la vigilancia de la seguridad perimetral del Cefereso de Almoloya de Juárez, cuando, a través de un túnel construido exprofeso, se fugó el narcotraficante Joaquín Guzmán Loera el 11 de julio de ese año. (Proceso 1889, 1914, 1933, 2018, 2020 y 2022).

The point made here is that Siguenza was the commander of the Eighth Mechanized Regiment of the Mexican Army when El Chapo escaped from prison through a tunnel on Siguenza’s watch, which again, suggests his collaboration with organized crime.  But we are moving ahead in time, in terms of Siguenza’s career.  As Carlos Fazio notes (Estado de Emergencia, p 101), in 2009, Siguenz, as a colonel in the military police, ordered arrest of general Moreno Avila and 30 of his subordinates, suggesting the power of Siguenza wielded within the military, which also explains how the military is able establish its connections with organized crime. 

But all of this is acceptable to the United States.  Why?  If one follows the reasoning of Carlos Fazio, for geopolitical reasons. There is increased geopolitical tension in the world and the United States is worried about the capacities of Russia and China to exercise economic and political influence in Latin America, particularly in the U.S.’s near abroad:  the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.  Fazio writes about the Pentagon War Games that would occur in May of 2022 involving the United States and numerous allies, off of the shores of Quintana Roo, in close proximity to AMLO’s big mega projects:  the tren maya and intercoastal highway of Tehauntepic. 

What does all of this suggest?  Obviously the priority of national security over the military’s involvement in the war on drugs.  We could see a similar pattern in Central America and Colombia, regions where the military is clearly involved with and protecting the drug trade, but that does not matter because the military is also the guarantor for the operation of extractive economies throughout the region - throughout, that is, what Greg Grandin (can’t find right now) has termed the cone of insecurity, extending from Mexico in the North to the Colombia in the South.  The security tasks for the United States are twofold - maintain internal stability (an objective accomplished through Plan Colombia and Plan Mexico) and maintain external security - hence achieving greater interoperational capacity between the U.S. and the military forces of client states in the region, of which Mexico is one.  In this sense, I think it is clear that Mexico’s Fourth Transformation unfolds harmoniously within the U.S.’s regional security framework.  More problematic would be the recent presidential victory of Gustav Petro in Colombia.